Why is the EHDS revolutionary?
More data, because it's safer
The EHDS aims to make more data available for secondary use by making it more secure. The GDPR will continue to apply alongside the EHDS. This privacy regulation already stipulates that the use of health data (in short) is permitted if there is a good purpose, if the law is followed, and if sufficient technical and organizational measures have been taken. The EHDS stipulates the same, but in more detail: working with health data is permitted if it serves a useful purpose, as described in the EHDS. This will be assessed by a newly established government body, the Health Data Access Body (HDAB), which will assess compliance with the GDPR in addition to the EHDS. Subsequently, users will not receive data, but a permit to work with that data, which will specify the precise conditions, such as the requirement to work in a secure processing environment (SEPA). In other words, users will not receive data, but access to it. The HDAB will periodically verify whether the SEPAs are indeed (still) sufficiently secure.
A right to data
So far, there seems to be little new; there must be a good purpose, the work must be done lawfully, and the work must be carried out safely. Yet, the effects of the EHDS, by creating an HDAB and a data permit, are truly groundbreaking or revolutionary. Firstly, because the data must be shared much more widely: if the HDAB has determined that a scientist is permitted to work with data (as described in the permit), then the data holder is obligated to actually make it available. We already have various laws requiring data holders to make data available to the government itself, such as the Statistics Netherlands Act (CBS Act) and the RIVM Act (RIVM Act). But now, there is an obligation to make data available to permit holders, i.e., non-governmental organizations.
If an academic hospital now wants to use data from a nursing home, that nursing home can refuse, invoking the GDPR. Whether that appeal and refusal are justified can never be submitted to a court, because sharing data by the nursing home is a favor. Now, this becomes an obligation. The downside of this is that the academic hospital effectively acquires a right to (work with) data. This is not explicitly stated in the EHDS. However, a decision on a permit application is an administrative decision. If the permit is denied, an objection can be filed (with the DHAB itself) and then, if necessary, appeal to the administrative court. If the court determines that the academic hospital meets all the conditions for obtaining the permit, it will be granted the permit. Compare this to a permit for a dormer window; if all the conditions are met, it can no longer simply be denied. By creating a data permit, the EHDS indirectly creates a right to data.
Academic freedom
Moreover, in principle, everyone has the right to work with health data. Anyone can apply for a permit; any natural person or legal entity throughout the European Union. Obtaining such a permit requires pursuing a recognized purpose under the EHDS, but no distinction is made between, for example, citizen scientists and scientists from academic institutions. Of course, applicants will be assessed for their qualifications to achieve the intended objectives and therefore possess appropriate expertise. However, people like Albert Einstein, who work at a patent office, will have more opportunities under the EHDS to demonstrate their capabilities. This isn’t dangerous, because the HDAB will anonymize or pseudonymize the data as much as possible, and will not transfer it but make it available in a secure processing environment from which no data can be extracted, only conclusions.
Transfer of confidentiality decisions in case of secondary use
The next striking fact is that the authority to decide on the secondary use of health data is being taken away from individual healthcare providers and placed with the HDAB, the newly established government agency. The EHDS is therefore seen in the medical sector as a worrying restriction of medical confidentiality. In my opinion, it would be better to view it as a partial relocation of medical confidentiality, which is also not illogical. Remember, medical confidentiality was introduced by doctors themselves, at a time when the rule of law did not yet exist; 2,000 years ago. That was fantastic, of course, but now we do have a well-functioning rule of law and a government agency that oversees the protection of privacy. Previously, there was no choice as to where decisions on secondary data use should be placed, but now there is. And in that case, an independent government agency is a more logical choice than the doctors themselves.
Most doctors are, of course, honest and well-meaning, but unfortunately, there are bad apples in every profession. A bad doctor has a personal interest in medical confidentiality. An independent government agency does not. The EHDS explicitly states that the HDAB must be safeguarded to ensure its independence; there must be no conflicting interests. Individual healthcare providers do, however. Moreover, we cannot expect healthcare providers to all be familiar with the GDPR, while an HDAB is. Ultimately, the importance of the privacy of the individual patient conflicts with the importance of medical progress for society as a whole; the interest of other patients and future generations in being able to research and discover new treatment methods. An independent agency is better positioned to weigh individual versus collective interests, current versus future interests. Therefore, with regard to secondary use of data, medical confidentiality is not so much restricted as displaced by the EHDS. And in our fairly well-functioning constitutional state, that is a logical choice from a legal perspective.
The EHDS is about data, not bodily material. The Dutch draft Bodily Material Act is about material, not data. This might lead one to believe there's no overlap. But if you extract data from material, you're doing something with both data and material. That's why I'm discussing my thoughts on the draft act here. Spoiler alert: it's not good.
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport will soon determine who will become the HDAB; who will be the source of permits for the beneficial reuse of health data. Who can be this, and who cannot? And what will this HDAB be responsible for?
Under the EHDS, work must be performed in a Secure Processing Environment (SPE). Scientists don't receive data, but access it in a SPE that meets the strict technical and security standards established under the EHDS. What does this entail? And will everyone be required to work in such a SPE from now on? Will it become a supercomputer containing all our health data?